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CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE: THE NEED FOR
UNIFORMITY IN INTERNATIONAL CHILD
CUSTODY DISPUTE CASES
Zadora M. Hightower
But in the real world, you couldn’t . . . just split a family 
down the middle, mom on one side, dad [on] the other, 
with the child equally divided between. It was like when 
you ripped a piece of paper in[] two: no matter how you 
tried, the seams never fit exactly right again. It was what 
you couldn’t see, those tiniest of pieces, that were lost in 
the severing, and their absence kept everything from 
being complete.
Sarah Dessen, What Happened to Goodbye1
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INTRODUCTION
It is undeniable that international travel has increased in
recent years. This of course results in individuals of different 
countries, cultures, and religions forming friendships and 
relationships. Some of these relationships lead to marriages and
in turn to the creation of families. Unfortunately, some of
these marriages do not last and families break apart. The 
divorce rate in the United States continues to rise and the idea
of shared custody is becoming more common in the United
States.2 Shared custody can become problematic not only when 
parents live in different states, but is especially difficult when the 
parents reside in different countries.3 This already complicated 
situation can become even more difficult if parents do not agree 
on where to raise the child and who will raise the child, which 
may then lead to international child abductions if no middle 
ground can be found.4
Child abductions have existed since the latter part of the 
twentieth century, but due to the increase of bi-cultural
marriages and divorces, as well as the continued ease of
international travel, international child abductions have increased 
2. Lexi Maxwell, The Disparity in Treatment of International
Custody Disputes in American Courts: A Post-September 11th Analysis, 17
PACE INT’L L. REV. 105, 105 (2005).
3. See id.
4. See id.
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in frequency.5 Child abduction is defined as the “‘unilateral 
removal or retention of children by parents, guardians, or close 
family members[;]’” however, abductions by the non-custodial
parent or family member make up the majority of child 
abductions.6 A parent will usually abduct their child to have 
control over the child in a new jurisdiction and often believes 
that moving the child to the new jurisdiction will be in the 
child’s best interest.7 Such decisions are frequently influenced
by the abducting parent’s religious and cultural beliefs.8
International child abductions raise concerns for a multitude 
of reasons, but the greatest concern is the effect of the abduction
on the child. An international child abduction results in the child 
losing contact not only with one parent, but also with the culture, 
environment, and people the child is familiar with.9
Additionally, the new country will often have a different
language, culture, social custom, and legal system, making 
adjustment difficult for the child.10 Such differences, as well as
a strained relationship between the separated parents, can
make the decision of whether to return the child to their 
former country or to permit the child to remain in the new 
country a challenging one.
Little attention was paid to the subject of international child 
abduction, so several countries decided to tackle the issue,
which resulted in the creation of the Hague Convention of 25 
5. Smita Aiyar, International Child Abductions Involving Non-
Hague Convention States: The Need for a Uniform Approach, 21 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 277, 277 (2007); Hague Conference of Private Int’l Law, 
Outline: Hague Child Abduction Convention: The Hague Convention of 25
October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction HCCH, 1 
(July 2012), http://www.hcch.net/upload/outline28e.pdf [hereinafter The 1980 
Hague Convention Outline].
6. Aiyar, supra note 5,  at  278 (quoting PAUL R. BEAUMONT T.
& PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD 
ABDUCTION 1 (1999)).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. The 1980 Hague Convention Outline, supra note 5, at 1.
10. Id.
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October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction (“the Hague Convention).11 The Hague Convention
seeks “to protect children from the harmful effects of cross-
border abductions (and wrongful retentions) by providing a 
procedure designed to bring about the prompt return of such 
children to the State of their habitual residence.”12 This goal was 
reaffirmed in the Hague Convention of 1996 on the International 
Protection of Children, which made small subsequent changes to 
the Hague Convention.13
Although the Hague Convention and the subsequent Hague 
Children Conventions have accomplished much by creating a 
process to help return children to their habitual residence, 
complications and uncertainties still remain. One such
unanswered question is whether or not to extend comity to the
court orders and judgments of foreign courts, especially if the
foreign state is a non-signatory to the Hague Convention.
Presently, there is no uniform approach on this issue either 
internationally or domestically.14 In the United States custody 
determinations are made by state courts, which have resulted in a 
lack of uniformity across the nation.15
The purpose of this student note is to explore the
extension of comity in international child custody cases. Part I
of this note will discuss the Hague Convention, the
International Abduction Remedies Act, and the Uniform Child-
Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act. Part II of this note will 
discuss the issues arising under the Hague Convention and the 
International Abduction Remedies Act. Part III will discuss
the common law concept of comity and the challenges of 
applying comity to foreign jurisdictions, especially those that are 
11. Maxwell, supra note 2, at 105.
12. The 1980 Hague Convention Outline, supra note 5, at 1.
13. See Hague Conference of Private Int’l Law, Outline: Hague 
Convention on Child Protection: The Hague Convention of 1996 on the 
International Protection of Children, H C C H ,  1 ( S e p t .  2 0 0 8 ) ,  
h t t p : / / w w w. h c c h . n e t / u p l o a d / o u t l i n e3 4 e . p d f [hereinafter The
1996 Hague Convention Outline].
14. Maxwell, supra note 2, at 106-07.
15. Id.
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non-signatories to the Hague Convention. Lastly, Part IV will
discuss concrete examples of the extension of comity or the 
declination to do so in United States courts, as well as the 
approach taken by courts in the United Kingdom.
A. The Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
The Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague 
Convention”) concluded on October 25, 1980.16 The Hague 
Convention entered into force on December 1, 1983.17 As of
December 14, 2012, the Hague Convention had 89 Contracting
States.18 The Hague Convention has two objectives: “(a) to
secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or 
retained in any Contracting State; and (b) to ensure that rights of 
custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are 
effectively respected in the other Contracting States.”19 The
Hague Convention is also based on three presumptions: (1) that 
other than in “exceptional circumstances, the wrongful removal
or retention of a child” is not in the child’s best interest; (2) that 
the return of the child is in the child’s best interest to ensure 
contact with both parents and to promote stability; (3) and that 
any custody issues are heard and decided by the most
appropriate court.20 The Hague Convention explicitly states
that the return of wrongfully retained or removed children is
16. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt28en.pdf [hereinafter The Hague
Convention].
17. Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction: Status Table, HCCH,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2013).
18. Id.
19. The Hague Convention, supra note 16, art. 1.
20. The 1980 Hague Convention Outline, supra note 5, at 1.
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preferred.21 The Hague Convention also serves the purpose of
deterrence. The return order is intended to help prevent child 
abductions, to return things to the way they were before the 
abduction, and to prevent parents from benefitting from 
wrongful removal or retention.22
The Hague Convention explains that it applies to “any child
who was habitually resident in a Contracting State immediately
before any breach of custody or access.”23 Therefore, the 
Hague Convention applies not only to custody rights, but also
to visitation rights.24 Originally, the Hague Convention applied
only to children under the age of sixteen.25 This age limit was 
later raised to eighteen by the Convention of 19 October 1996 on 
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-
Operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures 
for the Protection of Children (hereinafter “the 1996 Hague
Convention”).26 The United States became a signatory of this 
Convention on October 10, 2010.27 The 1996 Hague Convention 
also added language to permit a Contracting State to request to 
hear a case if doing so would be in the child’s best interest or if 
the Contracting State has a substantial connection with the 
child.28
21. The Hague Convention, supra note 16, art. 12.
22. The 1980 Hague Convention Outline, supra note 5, at 1.
23. The Hague Convent ion ,  supra note 16, art. 4.
24. Id. art. 5.
25. Id. art. 4.
26. The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law,
Recognition, Enforcement and Co-Operation in Respect of Parental
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, art. 2, Oct. 19,
1996 (entered into force Dec. 1, 2002), http://www.hcch.net/upload/
conventions/txt34en.pdf [hereinafter The 1996 Hague Convention].
27. Status Table: Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of 
Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, HC C H,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=70 (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2013).
28. The 1996 Hague Convention, supra note 26, arts. 8, 11.
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To enforce its provisions, the Hague Convention requires 
each Contracting State to select a Central Authority.29 Each of 
the Central Authorities is to cooperate with not only the Central 
Authorities of other Contracting States, but also with the 
authorities within the respective Contracting States to ensure the 
return of wrongfully retained or removed children and to achieve 
the goals of the Hague Convention.30 The Hague Convention 
directs “any person, institution or other body claiming that a 
child has been removed or retained in breach of custody rights” 
to apply for the return of the child to the Central Authority of the 
child’s habitual residence or any other Central Authority that can 
assist in the child’s return.31 However, such an applicant is not 
restricted from applying directly to the Contracting State’s 
judicial or administrative authorities whether or not they do so 
under the Hague Convention.32
In order to secure the return of the child, the applicant must 
establish the following requirements under Article 3 of the 
Hague Convention: (1) the child was a habitual resident of 
another State; (2) the removal or retention of the child was a 
breach of custody rights under the laws of the other State; and 
(3) that when the wrongful removal or retention occurred, the 
applicant was exercising their custody rights over the child.33
Even if the applicant can establish these requirements, the 
Central Authority may still choose to refuse to order the return of 
the child in certain circumstances.34 Article 12 allows the child 
to remain in the Contracting State if the application for return of 
the child was made one year after the wrongful removal or
retention and if the child has settled into their new home in the 
Contracting State.35 Article 13 permits the child to remain in the
Contracting State if the applicant was not exercising their 
29. The Hague Convention, supra note 16, art. 6.
30. Id. art. 7.
31. Id. art. 29.
32. Id. art. 8.
33. The Hague Convention Outline, supra note 5, at 2.
34. Id.
35. The Hague Convention, supra note 16, art. 12.
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custody rights at the time of the wrongful removal or retention or 
“consented to or subsequently acquiesced” to the removal to or 
retention of the child in the Contracting State.36 Article 13 also 
permits the child to remain in the Contracting State if there is 
“grave risk” that the return of the child “would expose the
child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the 
child in an intolerable situation.”37 Furthermore, Article 13 
permits the child to remain in the Contracting State if the child 
has reached “an age and degree of maturity” at which the child’s 
wishes can be taken into account.38 Lastly, Article 20 permits the 
child to remain in the Contracting State if returning the
child would violate the Contracting State’s “fundamental 
principles . . . relating to the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”39 However, per Article 18, the Hague
Convention does not restrict a judicial or administrative 
authority from ordering the return of the child.40
In the event that the return of the child to the State of
habitual residence is ordered, the Hague Convention clearly
states that such a return order is not a custody determination.41
Therefore a return order is unrelated to any underlying child
custody issues and does not affect the merits of any child
custody case.42 If Contracting States are dissatisfied with
certain aspects of the Hague Convention, Article 36 permits
Contracting States to contract around the requirements of the 
Hague Convention.43
36. Id. art. 13.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. art. 20.
40. Id. art. 18.
41. The 1980 Hague Convention Outline, supra note 5, at 1.
42. The Hague Convention, supra note 16, art. 19.
43. Id. art. 36.
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B. The International Child Abduction Remedies
On April 29, 1988 the United States ratified the Hague 
Convention and became a Contracting State.44 On the same day, 
Congress also passed the International Abduction Remedies Act 
(“ICARA”) to implement the Hague Convention.45 ICARA is 
based on the following presumptions, which are similar to the 
presumptions of the Hague Convention: (1) wrongfully 
removing or retaining children is “harmful to their well-being;” 
(2) individuals should not be permitted to gain from their
wrongful actions; (3) international wrongful removal or 
retention of children is increasing and international cooperation 
is necessary to solve the issue; and (4) the Hague Convention is a 
complete treaty to deal with the problem of international child 
abduction and retention as well as to deter these wrongful 
actions.46
ICARA gives the President the authority to designate a 
federal government agency as the Central Authority required by 
the Hague Convention.47 The current central authority is the U.S. 
Department of Justice, Civil Division, Office of International 
Judicial Assistance.48 ICARA also grants state and federal
courts “concurrent original jurisdiction of actions arising
under the [Hague] Convention.”49 Additionally, ICARA sets
the burden of proof for actions arising under the Hague 
Convention.50 For the applicant petitioning for the return of the 
child or for rights of access, the burden of proof is by a 
44. Tracy Bateman Farrell, An notat ion ,  Construction and
Application of Grave Risk of Harm Exception in Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction as Implemented in
International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(e)(2)(A),
56 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 163, § 2 (2011).
45. Id.
46. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §
11601(a) (1988) [hereinafter ICARA].
47. Id. at § 11602(9).
48. HCCH, Authorities, Oct. 3, 2013, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.
php?act=authorities.details&aid=279.
49. ICARA, supra note 46, at § 11603(a).
50. Id. at §11603(e).
646 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.2
preponderance of the evidence.51 For the individual opposing the 
petition for the return of the child, there are two different burden 
of proof standards. If the exception falls under Article 13(b) (the 
grave risk exception) or Article 20 (the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms exception) of the Hague 
Convention, then the burden of proof rises to by clear and 
convincing evidence.52
Section 11603(g) of ICARA is the “full faith and credit” 
clause.53 This section explains that “full faith and credit” requires 
States to respect orders for the return or denial of return.54
However, “States” has historically been interpreted to mean U.S. 
states and not foreign States.55 Furthermore, “as a general matter, 
‘judgments rendered in a foreign nation are not entitled to the 
protection of full faith and credit.’”56 However, U.S. courts will 
usually extend comity to foreign decrees.57 This deference is 
limited because the decision to extend comity often requires 
analysis of the foreign judicial system’s fairness.58
C. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act
The Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act 
(“UCCJEA”) was promulgated by the Uniform Law 
Commissioners (“ULC”), also known as National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) in 1997.59
51. Id. at § 11603(e)(1).
52. Id. at § 11603(e)(2).
53. Id. at § 11603(g).
54. Id.
55. Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2001).
56. Id. at 142 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
98 cmt. b (1971)).
57. Diorinou, 237 F.3d at 142.
58. Id. at 143.
59. Unif. Law Comm’n, Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
Act Summary, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Child%
20Custody%20Jurisdiction%20and%20Enforcement%20Act (last visited Ap. 6, 
2013) [hereinafter Child Custody Jurisdiction Act]; Unif. Law Comm’n, About 
the ULC, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the
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The purpose of UCCJEA was to replace and to improve the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”), which
was promulgated in 1968.60 The UCCJA was promulgated to
prevent parents from abducting their children and forum
shopping to achieve the custody verdict most favorable to 
them.61 Although the UCCJA was a step in the right direction, 
its effectiveness was hindered by several limitations. The 
UCCJA did not address issues arising if multiple states had 
jurisdiction nor did the UCCJA establish enforcement
procedures.62 Additionally, when states passed the UCCJA, 
most states made modifications to the Act, which then resulted in 
a lack of uniformity across the various jurisdictions.63
To deal with these problems, UCL promulgated the UCCJEA. 
As of this writing, the UCCJEA has been adopted by all fifty 
states, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and 
Guam.64 The UCCJEA is divided into two components: 
jurisdiction, which is discussed in Articles 1 and 2, and 
enforcement, which is discussed in Article 3.65 The UCCJEA 
applies to custody and visitation cases arising out of “divorce, 
separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, 
termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic 
violence.”66 The UCCJEA does not apply to child support or 
adoption cases.67 Specifically, the UCCJEA regulates U.S. 
courts’ jurisdiction to issue “permanent, temporary, initial, and 
modification orders” regarding child custody.68 Furthermore, 
%20ULC (last visited Apr. 6, 2013)[hereinafter About ULC].
60. Child Custody Jurisdiction Act supra note 59.
61. Patricia M. Hoff, The Uniform Child-Custody and Enforcement Act,
OJJP: Juvenile Justice Bulletin, 2
(Dec. 2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/189181.pdf [hereinafter 
OJJDP Bulletin].
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. About ULC, supra note 59.
65. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.27.011-121, 201-291 (West 1997).
66. OJJDP Bulletin, supra note 61, at 4.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 5.
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Article 105 of the UCCJEA explains that for purposes of the 
UCCJEA, U.S courts are to treat a foreign State as a sister 
state.69 Furthermore, the UCCJEA requires that child custody 
determinations made by foreign States in conformity with the 
UCCJEA must be recognized and enforced as mandated in 
Article 3.70 However, if the child custody law of the foreign 
State contradicts the state’s fundamental human right principles 
as laid out in Article 20 of the Hague Convention, then the 
UCCJEA does not apply.71
The UCCJEA grants initial jurisdiction in five instances: 
home state jurisdiction; significant connection jurisdiction; more 
appropriate forum jurisdiction; vacuum jurisdiction; and 
temporary emergency jurisdiction.72 First, a court will have 
home state jurisdiction if the court is located in the child’s home 
state or is located in the state that was the child’s home state 
within the six months following the commencement of the child 
custody proceedings.73 A court will have significant connection 
jurisdiction if the child does not have a home state or if the home 
state refuses to exercise jurisdiction.74 If both the child’s home 
state and the significant connection state(s) refuse to exercise
jurisdiction because another more appropriate forum exists, then 
that state will have more appropriate forum jurisdiction.75 If no 
court can be found to satisfy home state jurisdiction, significant
connection jurisdiction, or more appropriate forum jurisdiction 
requirements, then an alternate court may step in and assume 
vacuum jurisdiction.76 Lastly, courts may assume temporary 
emergency jurisdiction if the child was abandoned or if the child, 
its sibling, or its parent has suffered “or is threatened with
69. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
§26.27.051(1).
70. Id. at § 26.27.051(2).
71. Id. at § 26.27.051(3).
72. Id. at § 26.27.201(1).
73. OJJDP Bulletin, supra note 61, at 5.
74. Id. 
75. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, §
26.27.201(1)(c).
76. Id. at § 26.27.201(1)(d).
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mistreatment or abuse.”77 Courts are permitted to exercise 
temporary emergency jurisdiction even if proceedings have 
begun in another state.78
Additionally, the orders of a court with temporary emergency 
jurisdiction may become permanent. If there are no prior custody 
orders enforceable under the UCCJEA and no proceedings have 
begun in a court with jurisdiction, then the temporary emergency 
custody order becomes permanent once the issuing state 
becomes the child’s home state.79 If there is a previous custody 
order and there is a custody proceeding in a court with 
jurisdiction, then the temporary emergency custody order 
remains in effect until the court with jurisdiction issues a custody 
order within the specified time period.80 If there is only a 
custody proceeding in a court with jurisdiction, then the 
temporary emergency custody order also remains in effect only 
until the court with jurisdiction issues a custody order within the 
specified time period.81 Unlike the UCCJA, the UCCJEA also
includes enforcement provisions and requires state courts to 
recognize and enforce child-custody determinations made in 
substantial conformity with the jurisdictional provisions of the 
Act or made under factual circumstances that meet the 
jurisdictional standards of the Act.”82
PART II
A. Issues Arising Under the Hague Convention and the 
UCCJEA
Although the Hague Convention has been very helpful to deal 
with the issues arising in international child abduction cases 
involving Hague Convention signatories, the Hague Convention 
77. OJJDP Bulletin, supra note 61, at 6.
78. Id.
79. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, §
26.27.231(2).
80. Id. at § 26.27.231(3).
81. Id.
82. OJJDP Bulletin, supra note 61, at 8.
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does not provide guidance regarding non-signatories of the 
Hague Convention. The Hague Convention only applies when
the States involved are signatories of the Convention.83 The
Hague Convention does not apply if: (1) the child’s habitual
residence is not a signatory of the Hague Convention; (2) one or 
both of the parents are citizens of a non-signatory State; or (3) 
the child is removed or retained in a non-signatory State, no 
matter if the child previously resided in a signatory State.84 In 
her article, Smita Aiyar suggests that the Hague Convention 
should be amended to create a uniform approach to apply to 
situations involving non-signatories of the Hague Convention.85
To date, the United States also has not created a uniform
approach on how to deal with international child abduction 
cases that involve non-signatories of the Hague Convention.86
As previously explained, in most cases, U.S. courts will treat a 
foreign state as a sister state when applying the UCCJEA. 
Therefore, if a foreign state has jurisdiction over an international 
custody case, U.S. courts will relinquish jurisdiction or direct 
that the child be returned to its home country.87 However, if the
U.S. court finds that Section 105(c), the so-called “escape
clause,” applies, then the U.S. court is not required to return the 
child to its country of habitual residence. Specifically, the escape 
clause explains that the UCCJEA does not apply “if the child 
custody law of a foreign country violates fundamental
principles of human rights.”88 Unfortunately, the section does 
not explain what the custody laws entail or what would be 
considered a violation of fundamental principles of human 
rights.
This can create serious issues when dealing with foreign 
states that are not signatories to the Hague Convention; however, 
83. The Hague Convention, supra note 16, art. 1.
84. Aiyar, supra note 5, at 290.
85. Id. at 282.
86. Id. at 281.
87. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act § 105(c) 
(1997).
88. Id.
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Section 105(c) can also create issues if the foreign state is a 
member to the Hague Convention.89 This is because U.S. courts 
must consider domestic laws in some instances to determine 
whether or not to issue new custody orders, modify existing 
orders, or whether to recognize and enforce existing orders of 
foreign states.90 In such cases, U.S. courts will rely on the
common law doctrine of comity.91 However, an exception to
the principle of comity exists, which permits courts to ignore the 
concept if utilizing comity would be contrary to U.S. public 
policy.92
The language in Section 105(c) is very similar to the language 
in Article 20 of the Hague Convention. As explained previously 
in Part I(a)., Article 20 permits the child to remain in the 
Contracting State if returning the child would violate the 
Contracting State’s “fundamental principles . . . relating to the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”93 The 
Article 20 defense has not been used frequently in the United 
States and even when the defense is raised, it has been rejected 
by courts except on one occasion.94 The Article 20 defense has 
been utilized infrequently outside of the United States and even 
more rarely has the defense been successful.95
The comment to UCCJEA Section 105(c) explains that the 
focus should be on the foreign state’s family and custody law, 
not on the legal system as a whole, when determining whether 
fundamental principles of human rights have been violated.96
This can create tensions because the custody laws of foreign 
states may be influenced by principles that do violate 
fundamental principles of human rights such as discrimination
89. D. Marianne Blair, International Application of the UCCJEA:
Scrutinizing the Escape Clause, 38 FAM. L. Q. 547, 551-52 (2004).
90. Id.
91. See discussion, infra Part III(a).
92. Blair, supra note 89, at 554.
93. The Hague Convention, supra note 15, art. 20.
94. Blair, supra note 89, at 564.
95. Id. at 565.
96. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, §
105(c).
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based on gender and restrictions on the freedom to marry.97
Therefore, narrow interpretations of Section 105(c) of the 
UCCJEA can be problematic as the family or custody law itself 
may not violate fundamental principles of human rights, but the
principles creating those laws do violate these fundamental
principles of human rights.98 An example of where such an issue 
could arise is the Islamic family law system. This is because
some may argue that Shari’a law violates fundamental principles
of human rights because Shari’a law discriminates based on 
gender and religion.99
B. Shari’a Custody Law As a Barrier to the Extension 
of Comity?
Many countries choose not to become signatories of the 
Hague Convention because they want to retain jurisdiction of 
child custody cases and do not want to be subjected to a required 
return of the child to the country of the child’s habitual 
residence.100 This conflict of international custody disputes 
involving the Hague Convention signatories and non-signatories 
is especially prevalent in Islamic countries because U.S. custody 
laws are very different from Shari’a custody laws.101 At the time 
of this writing, no foreign states with an Islamic family law 
system are signatories to the Hague Convention.102
“Since the seventh century, ‘Islam has been not just a 
religion, but a complete code for living, combining the spiritual 
and the temporal, and seeking to regulate not only the 
individual’s relationship with God, but all human social 
97. Blair, supra note 89, at 571.
98. Id. at 571-72.
99. See discussion, supra Par t  II(b).
100. Thomas Foley, Note, Extending Comity to Foreign Decrees in
International Custody Disputes Between Parents in the United States and
Islamic Nations, 41. FAM. CT. REV. 257, 261 (2003).
101. Id.
102. HCCH, Status Table: Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php
?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
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relationships.’”103 Shari’a law “refers to the historical 
formulations of Islamic religious law, including a universal 
system of law and ethics purporting to regulate all aspects of 
Muslim’s public and private life.”104 Shari’a law is an integral 
part of family law in Islamic legal systems and “states that 
‘[r]eligious and social values dictate the answers to questions of 
upbringing, parental authority. . . .”105 Although Shari’a law 
varies in the individual Islamic countries, these fundamental
principles are firmly entrenched in the Shari’a law value 
system.106
Under Sharia’a law the father has “ultimate legal custody of 
his children,” however, the mother retains physical custody of 
the children “‘during their years of dependency,’ which is age 
seven for boys and age nine for girls.”107 In addition to the value 
placed on the gender of the parents, another important facet is 
religious upbringing.108 All Islamic sects require the child to be 
raised Muslim.109 Shari’a law varies greatly among the Muslim 
nations; however, to a large extent Shari’a law is the same across 
all Muslim nations.110 For example, Shari’a law custody 
determinations are similar in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen 
because all religious and Shari’a courts require children to be 
raised Muslim, grant presumptive custody to the mother during 
the age of dependency, and determine the mother’s fitness to 
have custody using similar criteria.111 For example, even if the 
mother has custody of the child, many Islamic countries prohibit 
103. Foley, supra note 100, at 259 (quoting JAMAL J. NASIR, THE
ISLAMIC LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS 1 (1986)).
104. Id. at 260.
105. Aiyar, supra note 5, at 291 (quoting Lara Cardin, Comment, The 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction as 
Applied to Nonsignatory Nations: Getting to Square One, 20 HOUSE. J. INT’L.
L. 141, 157 (1996)).
106. Blair, supra note 89, at 570.
107. Foley, supra note 100, at 260-61.
108. Id. at 261.
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 260.
111. Id. at 264.
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her from “moving any substantial distance from the father 
without the father’s permission.”112
Although both U.S. courts and courts of Islamic nations 
consider what is in the child’s best interest to make custody
determinations, these courts make this determination in very 
different ways. U.S. custody law focuses on the child’s needs 
and the ability and willingness of the parents to meet the
child’s needs.113 This means considering factors such as: the
parents’ wishes; the child’s wishes; the relationship between the 
parents, the child, siblings, “and other significant persons;” 
continuity for the child; “the child’s adjustment to home, school, 
and community;” the child’s “health, safety, and welfare;” as 
well as the “the mental and physical health of all individuals 
involved.”114
Islamic custody law on the other hand focuses on Islamic 
social and religious values to make custody determinations.115
Islamic courts turn to Shari’a law, which is based on Islamic 
scriptures and teachings, to determine family law cases.116
Shari’a law places utmost importance on the religious upbringing 
of the child and believes that it is in the child’s best interest to be 
raised Muslim, while U.S. custody law places little emphasis on 
the religious upbringing of the child.117 Additionally, under 
Shari’a law the father has ultimate custody of children, 
contrasted with the Western idea that fathers and mothers have 
equal parental rights.118 Therefore, Shari’a is in direct 
contradiction with ideas of U.S. jurisprudence, which does not 
place much weight or emphasis on the religious upbringing of 
the child.119 U.S. custody law and Islam custody law focus on 
different factors to determine what is in the best interest of the 
112. Blair, supra note 89, at 571.
113. Foley, supra note 100, at 258.
114. Id. at 259.
115. Id. at 258.
116. Id. at 259.
117. Aiyar, supra note 5, at 292-93.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 292.
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child, therefore, U.S. custody law and Islamic custody law are 
often at odds with one another.
These distinct and important differences explain why Islamic 
countries are resistant to signing the Hague Convention, as the 
Convention directly contradicts with the Islamic legal systems
and religious beliefs. The Hague Convention focuses solely on
jurisdiction based on the habitual residence of the child, whereas 
Shari’a law places utmost importance on the gender of the 
parents, as well as the religious upbringing of the child.120 This 
presents an enormous conflict between the Hague Convention 
and Shari’a law. These differences then raise the question 
whether comity should be extended to court decisions that are 
based on Shari’a law because Shari’a law arguably violates 
Article 20 of the Hague Convention. One could argue that 
because Shari’a law discriminates based on gender and religion 
by preferring the paternal parent and the Muslim religion, Sharia 
law violates the principles of fundamental human rights of 
Article 20 of the Hague Convention.121 Therefore the UCCJEA 
does not apply and arguably comity should not be extended to 
such court decisions.122
PART III
A. Comity
Section 105 of the UCCJEA encourages U.S. courts to
practice a concept called “comity.”123 Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines comity as “[a] practice among political entities (as 
nations, states, or courts of different jurisdictions), involving 
especially mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and 
120. Id. at 292-93.
121. Id.
122. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, WASH.
REV. CODE ANN § 26.27.051(3) (1997).
123. Id. at § 26.27.421.
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judicial acts.”124 In Hilton v. Guyot, the U.S. Supreme Court 
further explained that 
[c]omity in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute 
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good 
will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or 
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its
own citizens, or of other persons who are under the 
protection of its laws.125
Internationally, states seem to have come to the consensus 
that foreign custody orders should be enforced and respected to 
ensure consistency and stability.126
A majority of U.S. state and federal courts have recognized 
foreign decrees even when the foreign state does not reciprocally 
recognize U.S. orders.127 In Diorinou v. Mezitis the Second 
Circuit explained that U.S. courts apply the principle of comity 
in at least three contexts: (1) if the U.S. court must determine if it 
has jurisdiction if litigation is pending or available in a foreign 
State; (2) if the U.S. court must determine if it should enforce a 
foreign decree; and (3) if the U.S. court must determine if it 
should respect and enforce the decree of a foreign State.128 This 
gives U.S. courts leeway to determine if they should or should 
not extend comity to court orders of foreign States.
B. Difficulties in Extending Comity to the Court Orders 
of Foreign Jurisdictions
As explained previously, Section 105 of the UCCJEA states
the U.S. state courts are to treat foreign States as sister states 
124. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), available at
WestlawNext.
125. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
126. Foley, supra note 100, at 263.
127. Id.
128. Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2001).
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rather than foreign states for purposes of Articles 1 and 2 of the 
UCCJEA.129 Furthermore, Section 105(c) of the UCCJEA states 
that the UCCJEA does not apply if the child custody laws of the
foreign state violate fundamental principles of human rights.130
Unfortunately, the UCCJEA does not define or describe what 
constitutes fundamental principles of human rights.
In regard to non-signatories of the Hague Convention, the 
comment to Section 105 explains that courts are to consider only 
the non-signatory state’s child custody laws, rather than the non-
signatory state’s legal system as a whole.131 The comment
does not specifically state which child custody related laws 
would violate the fundamental principles of human rights, 
however, the comment to Section 105 does clarifies that Section 
105(c) should only be utilized in “the most egregious cases.”132
C. Extending Comity to Non-Signatories of the Hague 
Convention
Following the approach set forth in UCCJEA Section 105 and 
its comments, creates an unequal balance of power in 
international child custody disputes. If the foreign state involved 
in the dispute is a non-signatory state, then the U.S. courts will 
treat the foreign state as though the foreign state were a sister 
state and order the child to return to the country of its habitual 
residence regardless of any defenses or exceptions that may exist 
under the Hague Convention, or the U.S. court will exercise 
comity and enforce the child custody order of the foreign 
State.133 This creates an inequality because the parent from the 
Hague Convention member state will not be permitted to raise 
Hague Convention defenses or exceptions, which will then grant 
an advantage to the parent living in the non-signatory State.134
129. See discussion, supra Part II(a).
130. Id.
131. Aiyar, supra note 5, at 308.
132. Id. at 309.
133. Id. at 309-10.
134. Id. at 309.
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Additionally, the UCCJEA does not differentiate between 
foreign states. This can create issues when dealing with foreign
states that are non-signatories of the Hague Convention because 
the parent in the non-signatory State has an additional remedy.135
For example, if the parent in the non-signatory state filed an 
application for the return of the child under the Hague 
Convention and the application is denied, the parent can then 
turn to the non-signatory state’s courts instead.136 If the applicant 
parent filed custody proceedings in the foreign state of which the 
child was a habitual resident, either before the child was 
wrongfully removed or retained or within six months of the 
wrongful removal or retention, then the applicant parent can use 
Section 105 of the UCCJEA to require the U.S. court to order the 
return of the child or the enforcement of the existing child 
custody order of the non-signatory foreign state.137 This would 
defeat the purpose of the Hague Convention because the U.S. 
court may have found a grave risk or other exception that would 
bar the return of the child, but as long as the custody laws of the 
non- signatory state do not violate fundamental principles of 
human rights, Section 105(c) of the UCCJEA, requires the return 
of the child.138 Thereby, Section 105(c) of the UCCJEA can be 
utilized to defeat the purpose of the Hague Convention.
The argument then becomes that Section 105(c) needs to be 
altered to reflect and protect the principles of the Hague 
Convention. Such a change would help protect children and 
parents from being removed to a foreign jurisdiction that would 
constitute a grave risk or if other exceptions to return of the child 
under the Hague Convention apply.139 Although the principle of 
comity was applied fairly uniformly in the United States, Lexi 
Maxwell suggests that since September 11, 2001, U.S. courts 
have grown leery of relinquishing jurisdiction of international 
child custody cases to non-signatories of the Hague 
135. Blair, supra note 89, at 579.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 579-80.
138. Id. at 580.
139. Id. at 579-81.
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Convention.140 She suggests that although U.S. courts had 
developed a pattern of keeping jurisdiction of cases that do not 
fall under the Hague Convention, this trend has increased in 
recent years.141 This trend reflects U.S. courts’ concerns that 
children will be removed to non-signatory states that are not 
required to follow U.S. court orders or the Hague Convention 
requirements, resulting in the courts of the non-signatory State 
issuing custody orders contrary to the existing U.S. court 
orders.142 There is no uniformity in how U.S. courts deal with 
this issue even when dealing with signatories of the Hague 
Convention. The traditional approach has been to value comity 
over the best interest of the child.
PART IV
A. Examples of United States Courts Extending Comity 
to Foreign Court Orders
Traditionally, U.S. courts have highly respected the decisions 
of other jurisdictions and usually extended comity. For example, 
in Diorinou v. Mezitis, the Second Circuit held that the Greek 
courts were entitled to comity.143 In a very convoluted set of 
facts, Nicolas Mezitis, a U.S. citizen, (“Mezitis”) and Marina 
Mezitis Diorinou, a Greek citizen, (“Diorinou”) were married in 
New York where their two children were born and raised.144
During a visit to Greece with their children, Mezitis and 
Diorinou, returned to New York separately, but left their 
children in Greece.145 Diorinou returned to Greece and reunited 
with her children.146 Mezitis then filed for divorce and custody 
of the children in the New York Supreme Court and Diorinou 
140. Maxwell, supra note 2, at 121.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 122.
143. Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 2001).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 136.
146. Id.
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filed for temporary custody of the children in the Court of First
Instance of Athens.147 The Court of First Instance of Athens 
provisionally awards Diorinou custody of the children.148 Mezitis 
also filed an ICARA suit in the Southern District of New York, 
as well as a Hague Convention petition for the return of the 
children to New York.149 During this time, Diorinou petitioned 
the Court of First Instance of Athens for permanent custody; 
however, the court postponed on Diorinou’s petition until a final 
judgment was entered on the Greek Hague Convention 
petition.150 After the dismissal of the Greek Hague Convention 
petition was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Thessaloniki, 
the Court of First Instance of Athens awarded Diorinou custody 
of the children.151
After losing his appeal of this decision, Mezitis removed the 
children back to New York without Diorinou’s permission and
Diorinou then also filed an ICARA lawsuit.152 The Greek trial 
court found that Diorinou’s retention of the children in Greece 
was not wrongful and this decision was affirmed by the Greek
appellate and supreme court.153 The Second Circuit explained 
that this decision was entitled to a lot of deference, but the 
degree of deference had to be determined by considering the
determinations made by the Greek courts.154 Although the 
Second Circuit questioned several of the Greek courts’ 
determinations and was concerned by conflicting custody orders 
from New York and Greek courts, the Second Circuit decided 
that deference and extension of comity was appropriate.155
Similarly, in Hosain v. Malik, the Court of Special Appeals in 
Maryland affirmed the trial court decision to extend comity to
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 136-37.
151. Id. at 137.
152. Id. at 136-38.
153. Id. at 143.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 145-46.
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Pakistani court orders.156 Hosain (name change due to the 
mother’s subsequent remarriage) followed Malik v. Malik.157 In
Malik, the child was born and raised in Pakistan to parents of 
Pakistani citizenship.158 After some time, the mother and child 
moved out of the couple’s home and the father subsequently
sued for custody.159
Upon learning of the custody suit, the mother took the child 
and moved to the United States without the father’s consent.160
The father was subsequently awarded custody by the Pakistani 
court and he managed to locate the mother and child in Maryland 
and a lawsuit ensued.161 The Maryland trial court determined that 
the Pakistani court was not entitled to comity and awarded 
temporary custody to the mother, which the father then
appealed.162 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed 
and remanded the case, holding that the trial court was not 
required to enforce an existing Pakistani child custody order, 
only if (1) the Pakistani court did not apply the best interest of 
the child standard or (2) the Pakistani child custody order was 
issued pursuant to substantive, evidentiary, or procedural law 
that was so contrary to Maryland public policy that it undermines 
confidence in the Pakistani child custody order.163
On remand following the Malik decision, the trial court found 
that the Pakistani court did apply the best interest of the child 
standard and that comity should be extended to the Pakistani 
court orders.164 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
affirmed, adding that in applying the best interest of the child 
standard, the Pakistani court was entitled to apply Pakistani 
custom even though such custom included paternal preference.165
156. Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988, 990 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
157. Id.
158. Malik v. Malik, 638 A.2d 1184, 1185 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1185-86.
162. Id. at 1186.
163. Id. at 1191.
164. Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988, 990 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
165. Id. at 1003-04 (citing Malik, 638 A.2d at 1184).
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“If the only difference between the custody laws of Maryland 
and Pakistan is that Pakistani courts apply a paternal preference 
the way Maryland once applied the maternal preference, the 
Pakistani order is entitled to comity.”166 Furthermore, although 
the court seemed to disagree with Pakistani order, stating “were 
we standing in the shoes of the Pakistani judge, we might have 
given greater or lesser weight to the various factors at issue, 
thereby reaching a different conclusion,” the court still extended 
comity to the Pakistani court order.167
In both of these cases, the U.S. courts decided to defer to the 
foreign court to determine what was in the child’s best interest. 
In Diorinou, the court barely mentioned the child’s best interest 
and simply extended comity to the Greek courts.168 In Malik, the 
Maryland court stated that the child’s best interest was at the 
heart of the case, but still the court chose to defer to the Pakistani 
court and extend comity, even though the Maryland court 
seemed to disagree with some of the determinations made by the
Pakistani court.169 The Maryland court could have made the 
argument that because the Pakistani court gave parental 
preference, the court order was discriminatory based on gender 
and therefore contrary to the public policy of the United States, 
which would then permit the Maryland court to refuse to extend 
comity, yet the court declined to do so and chose to extend 
comity to the Pakistani court.
B. Examples of United States Courts Declining to 
Extend Comity to Foreign Courts
Although the practice of U.S. courts seemed to be to extend 
comity to foreign jurisdictions, there has been a trend to place 
the child’s best interest over the legal concept of comity.170 In 
Van Driessche v. Ohio-Eseyeoboh, the United States District 
166. Hosain, 671 A.2d at 1004 (quoting Malik, 638 A.2d at 1184).
167. Id. at 1003.
168. Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2001).
169. Hosain, 671 A.2d at 1002-03.
170. Aiyar, supra note 5, at 312.
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Court for the Southern District of Texas determined that the full 
faith and credit clause of the ICARA did not apply and that 
comity should not be extended to the Belgian court orders. In 
Van Driessche, Ohio Eseyeoboh, the mother of the child and a
Nigerian citizen, met the child’s father, Van Driessche, a 
Belgian citizen, in Nigeria.171 The couple agreed that the child 
should be born in the United States and after the birth of the 
child, the family moved back to Belgium.172 However, the 
marriage deteriorated and Ohio Eseyeoboh moved back to the 
United States and a Belgian court determined that Van Driessche
had parental rights and awarded him “exclusive parental 
authority.”173
However, in the custody suit that followed in Texas, the 
district court concluded that it would not grant comity because 
there were no other outstanding Hague petitions and because the 
full faith and credit clause did not apply because Belgium is a 
foreign state rather than a domestic state.174 The court then 
ignored the Belgian court order and determined that (1) Van 
Driessche had no case because his Hague petition for the return 
of his daughter was untimely, (2) he was unable to overcome 
Eseyeoboh’s defenses for wrongful removal, and (3) his 
daughter was now settled in the United States.175 Therefore the 
court found it to be in the child’s best interest to remain in the 
United States and denied Van Driessche’s Hague petition despite 
the existing Belgian custody order.176
In Innes v. Carrascosa, the Superior Court of New Jersey 
declined to extend comity to a Spanish custody order.177 Innes, a 
U.S. citizen and father of the child, married Carrascosa, a 
Spanish citizen and mother of the child, in March 1999 and the 
following year, their daughter, Victoria, was born in the United 
171. Driessche v. Ohio-Esezeoboh, 466 F.Supp. 2d 828, 834 (2006).
172. Id. at 834-35.
173. Id. at 837-38.
174. Id. at 843.
175. Id. at 854.
176. Id. at 855.
177. Innes v. Carrascosa, 918 A.2d 686, 710 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2007).
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States where the family resided.178 Four years later, Carrascosa 
and Innes separated and in 2005 Carrascosa took Victoria to 
Spain in violation of Innes and Carrascosa’s parenting 
agreement.179 A whirlwind of custody and divorce claims 
followed, resulting in Carrascosa’s imprisonment in a New 
Jersey jail and Spanish courts finding that Carrascosa had not
wrongfully removed Victoria to Spain, thereby implicitly
awarding Carrascosa temporary custody of Victoria.180 The 
Superior Court of New Jersey refused to extend comity to the 
Spanish court’s decision because the decision was made in 
violation of New Jersey law and the Hague Convention.181
Specifically, the Hague Convention required New Jersey law to 
be applied as New Jersey was Victoria’s habitual residence and 
the Spanish courts applied Spanish law instead.182 Furthermore, 
the Spanish court’s decision contravened New Jersey public 
policy because New Jersey’s public policy is that it is in the best 
interests of the child for both parents to share custody absent a 
finding that doing so would not be in the child’s best interest.183
Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the trial court and 
declined to extend comity and ordered the return of Victoria to 
the United States.184
In these two cases, the U.S. courts did not defer to foreign 
courts to make the determination of the child’s best interest. 
Instead the courts chose to make the best interest determination 
themselves and declined to extend comity to the foreign courts.
C. The United Kingdom’s Approach to the Extension 
of Comity
The United Kingdom has taken the approach of valuing
the best interest of the child above the principle of conformity. 
178. Id. at 461-62.
179. Id. at 462-63.
180. Id. at 463-80.
181. Id. at 489-90.
182. Id. at 490.
183. Id. at 491
184. Id. at 491, 501.
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Similar to the U.S., the U.K. traditionally utilized international
comity in international custody cases if non-signatories of the
Hague Convention were involved.185 However, in 2005, the 
U.K. House of Lords in the case of in Re J. decided that when
British courts have jurisdiction over an international custody
case involving non- signatories to the Hague Convention, the 
“welfare principles,” rather than the Hague Convention will 
apply.186 Therefore, the protections of the Hague Convention do 
not automatically apply to non-signatories to the Hague 
Convention.
Under the idea of the welfare principles, the U.K. courts have 
decided that although conformity and observance of foreign 
court orders are important, they do not outrank the best interests 
of the child involved.187 Additionally, the in Re J. court pointed 
out that by failing to sign the Hague Convention, non-signatories 
are not entitled to automatically receive the benefits of the Hague 
Convention.188 Therefore, the best interest of the child is the 
most important concern in cases involving non-signatory States. 
The in Re J. court added that “[i]f an abducted child was 
returned to his habitual residence, it was because ‘it is in his best 
interests to do so, not because the welfare principle has been 
superseded by some other consideration.’”189 The House of 
Lords is the court of highest jurisdiction in the U.K and therefore 
this ruling means that U.K. courts are prohibited from 
automatically applying the Hague Convention to cases involving 
non- signatory states.190 Instead, the U.K. courts are to place the 
most weight on the child’s best interests and apply “the welfare 
principle.”191
185. Aiyar, supra note 5, at 300-02.
186. Id. at 306.
187. Id. at 302-03.
188. Id. at 305-06.
189. Id. at 306.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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CONCLUSION
In recent years the ease of travel has increased international 
travel and bi-cultural marriages. Unfortunately, these marriages 
can also result in parents disagreeing about where to raise their
children and some parents take the drastic measure of wrongfully
removing or retaining their children in foreign countries. The 
Hague Convention was put into place to help deal with the 
complicated issue of international child abduction. Specifically, 
the purpose of the Hague Convention is to “restore [the] pre-
abduction status quo and to deter parents from crossing borders 
in search of a more sympathetic court.”192 Although the Hague 
Convention has helped create a process for returning children to 
their habitual residence, the Hague Convention does not discuss 
how this process is affected by the involvement of non-
signatories of the Hague Convention.
Thus far, the United States has not created a uniform 
approach on whether to extend comity to the decisions of foreign 
courts, especially those that are non-signatories of the Hague 
Convention. Although the prior trend seemed to be to respect 
decisions of foreign States, thereby warranting an extension of 
comity, many U.S. courts are choosing to determine what is in 
the best interest of the child rather than simply extending comity 
to foreign States. This applies not only to non-signatories, but 
also to signatories of the Hague Convention. However, there is 
still no uniformity in the application of these trends. Therefore, it 
is important for the U.S. legislature and the U.S. courts to work 
together to create uniformity in such decisions and to prevent 
unjust results in international child custody cases.
One approach is to encourage the U.S. legislature to rewrite 
Section 105(c) to make the section more similar to the Hague 
Convention.193 Doing so would help ensure domestic and 
international uniformity, as well as give U.S. courts more factors 
to consider when rendering decisions in international child
custody and Hague Convention cases. Although revising 
192. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063 (6th Cir. 1996).
193. Blair, supra note 89, at 578-79.
2013] The Need for Uniformity in Int'l Child Custody Disputes 667
UCCJEA Section 105(c) to be similar or the same as the Hague 
Convention would solve some of the issues created by Section 
105(c), different issues could arise. One of these concerns is that 
U.S. courts would begin commandeering child custody cases or 
refuse to issue a return order even if it is not in the child’s best 
interest to do so.194
Alternatively, the United States could also utilize a principle 
similar to the one employed in the United Kingdom to help 
ensure uniformity. The United Kingdom utilizes the welfare 
principles and similarly, the United States could create a set of 
factors for U.S. courts to consider to determine what is in the 
best interest of the child before determining whether or not 
comity should be extended to court orders of foreign States. 
Although the risk still exists that U.S. courts may try to retain as 
many international child custody cases as possible, having a set 
of factors in place would hold U.S. courts accountable and help 
prevent unnecessary retention of international child custody 
cases.
Despite the importance of respecting foreign decrees, it is 
important not to lose sight of the most important factor in 
international child custody cases – the welfare of the child 
involved. The decisions made by courts in such cases will have a 
lasting and powerful impact on the child and therefore the child’s 
best interest should take precedence over any other 
considerations.
194. Aiyar, supra note 5, at 317-18. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
